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We propose a measure for systemic risk: CoVaR, the value at risk (VaR) of the financial system conditional
on institutions being under distress. We define an institution's contribution to systemic risk as the difference
between CoVaR conditional on the institution being under distress and the CoVaR in the median state
of the institution. From our estimates of CoVaR for the universe of publicly traded financial institutions,
we quantify the extent to which characteristics such as leverage, size, and maturity mismatch predict
systemic risk contribution. We also provide out of sample forecasts of a countercyclical, forward looking
measure of systemic risk and show that the 2006Q4 value of this measure would have predicted more
than half of realized covariances during the financial crisis.
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During times of ﬁnancial crises, losses tend to spread across ﬁnancial institutions, threatening
the ﬁnancial system as a whole.1 The spreading of distress gives rise to systemic risk–the
risk that the intermediation capacity of the entire ﬁnancial system is impaired, with potentially
adverse consequences for the supply of credit to the real economy. In systemic ﬁnancial events,
spillovers across institutions can arise from direct contractual links and heightened counterparty
credit risk, or can occur indirectly through price eﬀects and liquidity spirals. As a result of both,
measured comovement of institutions’ assets and liabilities tends to rise above and beyond levels
purely justiﬁed by fundamentals. Systemic risk measures capture the potential for the spreading
of ﬁnancial distress across institutions by gauging this increase in tail comovement.
The most common measure of risk used by ﬁnancial institutions–the value at risk (VaR)–
focuses on the risk of an individual institution in isolation. The %-VaR is the maximum
dollar loss within the %-conﬁdence interval; see Kupiec (2002) and Jorion (2006) for overviews.
However, a single institution’s risk measure does not necessarily reﬂect systemic risk–the risk
that the stability of the ﬁnancial system as a whole is threatened. First, according to the
classiﬁcation in Brunnermeier, Crocket, Goodhart, Perssaud, and Shin (2009), a systemic risk
measure should identify the risk to the system by “individually systemic” institutions, which
are so interconnected and large that they can cause negative risk spillover eﬀects on others, as
well as by institutions that are “systemic as part of a herd.” A group of 100 institutions that
act like clones can be as precarious and dangerous to the system as the large merged identity.
Second, risk measures should recognize that risk typically builds up in the background in the
form of imbalances and bubbles and materializes only during a crisis. Hence, high-frequency risk
measures that rely primarily on contemporaneous price movements are potentially misleading.
Regulation based on such contemporaneous measures tends to be procyclical.
The objective of this paper is twofold: First, we propose a measure for systemic risk. Second,
we outline a method to construct a countercyclical, forward looking systemic risk measure by
1Examples include the 1987 equity market crash, which was started by portfolio hedging of pension funds
and led to substantial losses of investment banks; the 1998 crisis, which was started with losses of hedge funds
and spilled over to the trading ﬂoors of commercial and investment banks; and the 2007-09 crisis, which spread
from SIVs to commercial banks and on to investment banks and hedge funds. See e.g. Brady (1988), Rubin,
Greenspan, Levitt, and Born (1999), Brunnermeier (2009), and Adrian and Shin (2010a).
1predicting future systemic risk using current institutional characteristics such as size, leverage,
and maturity mismatch. To emphasize the systemic nature of our risk measure, we add to
existing risk measures the preﬁx“ Co, ” which stands for conditional, contagion, or comovement.
We focus primarily on CoVaR, where institution ’s CoVaR relative to the system is deﬁned as the
VaR of the whole ﬁnancial sector conditional on institution  being in distress.2 The diﬀerence
between the CoVaR conditional on the distress of an institution and the CoVaR conditional
on the “normal” state of the institution, ∆CoVaR, captures the marginal contribution of a
particular institution (in a non-causal sense) to the overall systemic risk.
There are several advantages to the ∆CoVaR measure. First, while ∆CoVaR focuses on the
contribution of each institution to overall system risk, traditional risk measures focus on the risk
of individual institutions. Regulation based on the risk of institutions in isolation can lead to
excessive risk-taking along systemic risk dimensions. To see this more explicitly, consider two
institutions, A and B,w h i c hr e p o r tt h es a m eVaR, but for institution A the ∆CoVaR= 0,w h i l e
for institution B the ∆CoVaR is large (in absolute value). Based on their VaRs, both institutions
appear equally risky. However, the high ∆CoVaR of institution B indicates that it contributes
more to system risk. Since system risk might carry a higher risk premium, institution B might
outshine institution A in terms of generating returns in the run up phase, so that competitive
pressure might force institution A to follow suit. Regulatory requirements that are stricter for
institution B than for institution A would break this tendency to generate systemic risk.
One could argue that regulating institutions’ VaR m i g h tb es u ﬃcient as long as each insti-
tution’s ∆CoVaR goes hand in hand with its VaR. However, this is not the case, as (i) it is not
welfare maximizing that institution A should increase its contribution to systemic risk by fol-
lowing a strategy similar to institution B institution and (ii) empirically, there is no one-to-one
connection between an institution’s ∆CoVaR (y-axis) and its VaR (x-axis), as Figure 1 shows.
Another advantage of our co-risk measure is that it is general enough to study the risk
spillovers from institution to institution across the whole ﬁnancial network. For example, ∆
CoVaR| captures the increase in risk of individual institution  when institution  falls into
2Just as VaR sounds like variance, CoVaR sounds like covariance. This analogy is no coincidence. In fact,
under many distributional assumptions (such as the assumption that shocks are conditionally Gaussian), the VaR
of an institution is indeed proportional to the variance of the institution, and the CoVaR of an institution is
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Figure 1: The scatter plot shows the weak link between institutions’ risk in isolation, measured
by VaR (x-axis), and institutions’ contribution to system risk, measured by ∆CoVaR (y-axis).
The VaR and ∆CoVaR are unconditional 1% measures estimated as of 2006Q4 and are reported
in weekly percent returns for merger adjusted entities. VaR is the 1% quantile of ﬁrm returns,
and ∆CoVaR gives the percentage point change in the ﬁnancial system’s 1% VaR when a
particular institution realizes its own 1% VaR. The institutions used in the ﬁgure are listed in
Appendix D.
distress. To the extent that it is causal, it captures the risk spillover eﬀects that institution
 causes on institution . Of course, it can be that institution ’s distress causes a large risk
increase in institution , while institution  causes almost no risk spillovers onto institution .
That is, there is no reason why ∆CoVaR| should equal ∆ CoVaR|.
So far, we have deliberately not speciﬁed how to estimate the CoVaR measure, since there are
many possible ways. In this paper, we primarily use quantile regressions, which are appealing for
their simplicity and eﬃcient use of data. Since we want to capture all forms of risk, including not
only the risk of adverse asset price movements, but also funding liquidity risk (which is equally
important), our estimates of ∆CoVaR are based on (weekly) changes in (market-valued) total
assets of all publicly traded ﬁnancial institutions. However, ∆CoVaR can also be estimated
using methods such as GARCH models, as we show in the appendix.
Our paper also addresses the problem that (empirical) risk measures suﬀer from the rarity of
“tail observations”. After a string of good news, risk seems tamed, but, when a new tail event
3occurs, the estimated risk measure may sharply increase. This problem is most pronounced if
the data samples are short. Hence, regulatory requirements should be based on forward looking
risk measures. We propose the implementation of a forward-∆CoVaR that is constructed to be
forward looking and countercyclical.
We calculate unconditional and conditional measures of ∆CoVaR using the full length of
available data. We use weekly data from 1986Q1 to 2010Q4 for all publicly traded commercial
banks, broker-dealers, insurance companies, and real estate companies. While the unconditional
∆CoVaR estimates are constant over time, the conditional ones model variation of ∆CoVaR
as a function of state variables that capture the evolution of tail risk dependence over time.
These state variables include the slope of the yield curve, the aggregate credit spread, and
implied equity market volatility from VIX.W eﬁrst estimate ∆CoVaR conditional on the state
variables. In a second step we use panel regressions, and relate these time-varying ∆CoVaRs–in
a predictive, Granger causal sense–to measures of each institution’s characteristics like maturity
mismatch, leverage, market-to-book, size, and market beta.
We show that the predicted values from the panel regressions (which we call “forward
∆CoVaRs”) exhibit countercyclicality. In particular, consistent with the “volatility paradox”
that low volatility environments breed the build up of systemic risk, the forward ∆CoVaRs
are strongly negatively correlated with the contemporaneous ∆CoVaRs. We also demonstrate
that the “forward-∆CoVaRs” have out of sample predictive power for realized correlation in
tail events. In particular, the forward-∆CoVaRs estimated using data through the end of 2006
predicted half of the cross sectional dispersion in realized covariance during the ﬁnancial crisis
of 2008.
The forward-∆CoVaR can be used to monitor the buildup of systemic risk in a forward
looking manner. It indicates which ﬁrms are expected to contribute most to systemic ﬁnancial
crisis, based on current ﬁrm characteristics. The forward-∆CoVaR c a nt h u sb eu s e dt oc a l i b r a t e
the systemic risk capital surcharges. A capital surcharge based on (forward) systemic risk
contribution changes ex-ante incentives to conduct activities that generate systemic risk. In
addition, it increases the capital buﬀer of systemically important ﬁnancial institutions, thus
protecting the ﬁnancial system against the risk spillovers and externalities from systemically
important ﬁnancial institutions.
4Related Literature. Our co-risk measure is motivated by theoretical research on externalities
across ﬁnancial institutions that give rise to amplifying liquidity spirals and persistent distor-
tions. CoVaR tries to capture externalities, together with fundamental comovement. CoVaR
also relates to econometric work on contagion and spillover eﬀects.
Spillovers and “externalities” can give rise to excessive risk taking and leverage in the run-up
phase. The externalities arise because each individual institution takes potential ﬁre-sale prices
as given, while as a group they cause the ﬁre-sale prices. In an incomplete market setting,
this pecuniary externality leads to an outcome that is not even constrained Pareto eﬃcient.
This result was derived in a banking context in Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and a general
equilibrium incomplete market setting by Stiglitz (1982) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1986). Prices can also aﬀect borrowing constraints. These externality eﬀects are studied in
within an international ﬁnance context by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), and most re-
cently shown in Lorenzoni (2008), Acharya (2009), Stein (2009), and Korinek (2010). Runs on
ﬁnancial institutions are dynamic co-opetition games and lead to externalities, as does banks’
liquidity hoarding. While hoarding might be microprudent from a single bank’s perspective it
need not be macroprudent (fallacy of the commons). Finally, network eﬀects can also lead to
externalities, as emphasized by Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2010).
Procyclicality occurs because risk measures tend to be low in booms and high in crises.
The margin/haircut spiral and precautionary hoarding behavior outlined in Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2009) led ﬁnancial institutions to shed assets
at ﬁre-sale prices. Adrian and Shin (2010b) and Gorton and Metrick (2010) provide empirical
evidence for the margin/haircut spiral. Borio (2004) is an early contribution that discusses a
policy framework to address margin/haircut spirals and procyclicality.
Recently a number of systemic risk measures complementary to CoVaR have recently been
proposed. Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2010) develop a systemic risk indicator measured by the
price of insurance against systemic ﬁnancial distress, based on credit default swap (CDS) prices.
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) focus on high-frequency marginal expected
shortfall as a systemic risk measure. Like our “exposure CoVaR”, they switch the conditioning
and addresses the question which institutions are most exposed to a ﬁnancial crisis as opposed
to which institution contributes most to a crisis. Importantly, their analysis focuses on the cross
5sectional comparison across ﬁnancial institutions and do not address the problem of procyclical-
ity that arises from contemporaneuous risk measurement. In other words, they do not address
the stylized fact that risk is building up in the background during boom phases characterized by
low volatility and materializes only in crisis times. Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2010)
propose a systemic risk measure that relies on Granger causality among ﬁrms. Giglio (2011)
uses a nonparametric approach to derive bounds of systemic risk from CDS prices. A number of
recent papers have extended the CoVaR method and applied it to additional ﬁnancial sectors.
For example, Adams, Füss, and Gropp (2010) study risk spillovers among ﬁnancial institutions,
using quantile regressions; Wong and Fong (2010) estimate CoVaR for the CDS of Asia-Paciﬁc
banks; Gauthier, Lehar, and Souissi (2009) estimate systemic risk exposures for the Canadian
banking system.
The CoVaR measure is related to the literature on volatility models and tail risk. In a seminal
contribution, Engle and Manganelli (2004) develop CAViaR, which uses quantile regressions in
combination with a GARCH model to model the time varying tail behavior of asset returns.
Manganelli, Kim, and White (2011) study a multivariate extension of CAViaR,w h i c hc a nb e
used to generate a dynamic version of the CoVaR systemic risk measure.
The CoVaR measure can also be related to an earlier literature on contagion and volatility
spillovers (see Claessens and Forbes (2001) for an overview). The most common method to test
for volatility spillover is to estimate multivariate GARCH processes. Another approach is to
use multivariate extreme value theory. Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2004) develop a
contagion measure that focuses on extreme events. Danielsson and de Vries (2000) argue that
extreme value theory works well only for very low quantiles.
Another important strand of the literature, initiated by Lehar (2005) and Gray, Merton, and
Bodie (2007), uses contingent claims analysis to measure systemic risk. Bodie, Gray, and Merton
(2007) develop a policy framework based on the contingent claims. Segoviano and Goodhart
(2009) use a related approach to measure risk in the banking system.
Outline. The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. In Section 2, we outline
the methodology and deﬁne ∆CoVaR and its properties. In Section 3, we outline the estima-
tion method via quantile regressions. We also introduce time-varying ∆CoVaR conditional on
6state variables and present estimates of these conditional ∆CoVaR. Section 4 shows how to use
∆CoVaR to implement preemptive macroprudential supervision and regulation by demonstrat-
ing that institutional characteristics such as size, leverage, and maturity mismatch can predict
systemic risk contribution in the cross section of institutions. We conclude in Section 5.
2 CoVaR Methodology
2.1 Deﬁnition of CoVaR
Recall that VaR







where  is the variable of institution  for which the VaR
 is deﬁned. Note that VaR
 is
typically a negative number. In practice, the sign is often switched, a sign convention we will
not follow.
Deﬁnition 1 We denote by CoVaR
|
 the VaR of institution  (or the ﬁnancial system) con-
ditional on some event C
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For most of the paper we focus on the conditioning event of
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a n ds i m p l i f yt h e
notation to CoVaR
|
 . Furthermore, we primarily study the case where  = system, i.e., when
the return of the portfolio of all ﬁnancial institutions is at its VaR level. In this case, we drop the
superscript . Hence, ∆CoVaR denotes the diﬀerence between the VaR of the ﬁnancial system
conditional on the distress of a particular ﬁnancial institution  and the VaR of the ﬁnancial
system conditional on the median state of the institution .
7The more general deﬁnition of CoVaR|–i.e., the VaR of institution  conditional on in-
stitution  being at its VaR level–allows the study of spillover eﬀects across a whole ﬁnancial
network. Moreover, we can derive CoVaR| which answers the question of which insti-
tutions are most at risk should a ﬁnancial crisis occur. ∆CoVaR| reports institution ’s
increase in value-at-risk in the case of a ﬁnancial crisis. We call ∆CoVaR| the “expo-
sure CoVaR,” because it measures the extent to which an individual institution is aﬀected by
systemic ﬁnancial events.3
2.2 The Economics of Systemic Risk
Systemic risk has two important components. First, it builds up in the background during credit
booms when contemporaneously measured risk is low. This buildup of systemic risk during times
of low measured risk gives rise to a “volatility paradox.” The second component of systemic risk
relates to the spillover eﬀects that amplify initial adverse shocks in times of crisis.
The contemporaneous ∆CoVaR measure quantiﬁes these spillover eﬀects by measuring how
much an institution adds to the overall risk of the ﬁnancial system. The spillover eﬀects can
be direct, through contractual links among ﬁnancial institutions. This is especially the case
for institutions that are “too interconnected to fail.” Indirect spillover eﬀects are quantitatively
more important. Selling oﬀ assets can lead to mark-to-market losses for all market participants
who hold a similar exposure–common exposure eﬀect. Moreover, the increase in volatility
might tighten margins and haircuts forcing other market participants to delever as well (margin
spiral). This can lead to crowded trades which increases the price impact even further.
T h en o t i o no fs y s t e m i cr i s kt h a tw ea r eu s i n g in this paper captures direct and indirect
spillover eﬀects and is based on the tail covariation between ﬁnancial institutions and the ﬁ-
nancial system. Deﬁnition 1 implies that ﬁnancial institutions whose distress coincides with the
distress of the ﬁnancial system will have a high systemic risk measure. Systemic risk contribu-
tion gauges the extent to which ﬁnancial system stress increases conditional on the distress of
a particular ﬁrm, and thus captures spillover eﬀects. It should be noted, however, that the ap-
proach taken in this paper is a statistical one, without explicit reference to structural economic
3Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2010) and Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) propose systemic
risk measures that reverse the conditioning of CoVaR. These alternative measures thus use the same conditioning
logic as that for the “exposure CoVaR”.
8models. Nevertheless, we conjecture that the ∆CoVaR measure would give rise to meaningful
time series and cross sectional measurement of systemic risk in such economic theories.
Many of these spillovers are externalities. That is, when taking on the initial position
with low market liquidity funded with short-term liabilities–i.e. with high liquidity mismatch,
each individual market participant does not internalize that his subsequent individually optimal
response in times of crisis will cause a (pecuniary) externality on others. As a consequence the
initial risk taking is often excessive in the run-up phase.
In section 4, we construct a “forward ∆CoVaR”. This forward measure captures the stylized
fact that systemic risk is building up in the background, especially during in low volatility
environments. As a result, contemporaneous systemic risk measures are not suited to fully
capture the buildup component of systemic risk. Our “forward ∆CoVaR” measure avoids the
“procyclicality pitfall” by estimating the relationship between current ﬁrm characteristics and
future spillover eﬀects, as proxied by ∆CoVaR.
2.3 Properties of CoVaR
Cloning Property. Our CoVaR deﬁnition satisﬁes the desired property that, after splitting
one large “individually systemic” institution into  smaller clones, the CoVaR of the large
institution (in return space) is exactly the same as the CoVaRso ft h e clones. Put diﬀerently,
conditioning on the distress of a large systemic institution is the same as conditioning on one of
the  clones.
Causality. Note that the ∆CoVaR measure does not distinguish whether the contribution
is causal or simply driven by a common factor. We view this as a virtue rather than as a
disadvantage. To see this, suppose a large number of small hedge funds hold similar positions
and are funded in a similar way. That is, they are exposed to the same factors. Now, if only one
of the small hedge funds falls into distress, this will not necessarily cause any systemic crisis.
However, if the distress is due to a common factor, then the other hedge funds–all of which
are “systemic as part of a herd”–will likely be in distress. Hence, each individual hedge fund’s
co-risk measure should capture the notion of being “systemic as part of a herd” even in the
absence of a direct causal link. The ∆CoVaR measure achieves exactly that. Moreover, when
9we estimate ∆CoVaR, we control for lagged state variables that capture variation in tail risk
not directly related to the ﬁnancial system risk exposure.
Tail Distribution. CoVaR focuses on the tail distribution and is more extreme than the
unconditional VaR,a sCoVaR is a VaR that conditions on a “bad event”–a conditioning that
typically shifts the mean downwards, increases the variance, and potentially increases higher
m o m e n t ss u c ha sn e g a t i v es k e w n e s sa n dk u r t o s i s . T h eCoVaR, unlike the covariance, reﬂects
shifts in all of these moments. Estimates of CoVaR for diﬀerent  allow an assessment of the
degree of systemic risk contribution for diﬀerent degrees of tailness.
Conditioning. Note that CoVaR conditions on the event C, which we mostly assume to be
the event that institution  is at its VaR level, occurs with probability .T h a ti s ,t h el i k e l i h o o d
of the conditioning event is independent of the riskiness of ’s strategy. If we were to condition
on a return level of institution  (instead of a quantile), then more conservative (i.e., less risky)
institutions could have a higher CoVaR simply because the conditioning event would be a more
extreme event for less risky institutions.
Endogeneity of Systemic Risk. Note that each institution’s CoVaR is endogenous and
depends on other institutions’ risk taking. Hence, imposing a regulatory framework that inter-
nalizes externalities alters the CoVaR measures. We view as a strength the fact that CoVaR is
an equilibrium measure, since it adapts to changing environments and provides an incentive for
each institution to reduce its exposure to risk if other institutions load excessively on it.
Directionality. CoVaR is directional. That is, the CoVaR of the system conditional on
institution  does not equal the CoVaR of institution  conditional on the system.
Exposure CoVaR. The direction of conditioning that we consider is ∆CoVaR
|
 .H o w -
ever, for risk management questions, it is sometimes useful to compute the opposite conditioning,
∆CoVaR
|
 ,w h i c hw el a b e le x p o s u r e“ Exposure CoVaR”. The Exposure CoVaR is a mea-
sure of an individual institution’s exposure to system wide distress, and is similar to the stress
tests performed by individual institutions.
10CoES. Another attractive feature of CoVaR is that it can be easily adopted for other “corisk-
measures.” One of them is the co-expected shortfall, Co-ES. Expected shortfall has a number
of advantages relative to VaR4 and can be calculated as a sum of VaRs. We denote the CoES
,
the expected shortfall of the ﬁnancial system conditional on  ≤ VaR
 of institution .T h a ti s ,
CoES
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Ideally, one would like to have a co-risk measure that satisﬁes a set of axioms as, for example,
the Shapley value does (recall that the Shapley value measures the marginal contribution of a
player to a grand coalition).5
2.4 Market-Valued Total Financial Assets
Our analysis focuses on the VaR
 and ∆CoVaR
 of growth rates of market-valued total ﬁnancial
assets. More formally, denote by 
 the market value of an intermediary ’s total equity, and
by  
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,w h e r e

are book-valued total assets of institution . We thus apply the market-to-book equity ratio to
transform book-valued total assets into market-valued total assets.6
4Note that the VaR is not subadditive and does not take distributional aspects within the tail into account.
These concerns are however more of theoretical nature since the exact distribution within the tails is diﬃcult to
estimate.
5Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009) elaborate the Shapley value further, and Cao (2010) shows how to
use Shapley values to calculate systemic risk contributions of CoVaR. See also Brunnermeier and Cheridito (2011).
6There are several alternatives to generating market valued total assets. One possibility is to use a structural
model of ﬁrm value in order to calculate market valued assets. Another possibility is to add the market value of
equity to the book value of debt. We did not ﬁnd that any of these alternative ways to generate market valued
total assets had a substantial impact on the qualitative outcomes of the subsequent analysis.
11Our analysis uses publicly available data. In principle, a systemic risk supervisor could
compute the VaR
 and ∆CoVaR
 from a broader deﬁnition of total assets which would include
oﬀ-balance-sheet items, exposures from derivative contracts, and other claims that are not prop-
erly captured by the accounting value of total assets. A more complete description of the assets
and exposures of institutions would potentially improve the measurement of systemic risk and
systemic risk contribution. Conceptually, it is straightforward to extend the analysis to such a
broader deﬁnition of total assets.
We focus on the VaR
 and ∆CoVaR
 of total assets as they are most closely related to the
supply of credit to the real economy. Ultimately, systemic risk is of concern for economic welfare
as systemic ﬁnancial crisis have the potential to ineﬃciently lower the supply of credit to the
nonﬁnancial sector.
Our analysis of the VaR
 and ∆CoVaR
 for market valued assets could be extended to
compute the risk measures for equities or liabilities. For example, the ∆CoVaR
 for liabilities
captures the extent to which ﬁnancial institutions rely on debt funding–such as repos or com-
mercial paper–that can collapse during systemic risk events. Equity is the residual between
assets and liabilities, so the ∆CoVaR
 measure applied to equity can give additional information
about the systemic risk embedded in the asset-liability mismatch. The study of the properties of
∆CoVaR
 for these other items of intermediary balance sheets is a potentially promising avenue
for future research.
2.5 Financial Institution Data
W ef o c u so np u b l i c l yt r a d e dﬁnancial institutions, consisting of four ﬁnancial sectors: commercial
banks, security broker-dealers (including the investment banks), insurance companies, and real
estate companies. We start our sample in 1986Q1 and end it in 2010Q4. The data thus cover
three recessions (1991, 2001, and 2007-09) and several ﬁnancial crisis (1987, 1998, 2000, and
2008). We obtain daily market equity data from CRSP and quarterly balance sheet data from
COMPUSTAT. We have a total of 1226 institutions in our sample. For bank holding companies,
we use additional asset and liability variables from the FR Y9-C reports. Appendix C provides
a detailed description of the data.
123 CoVaR Estimation
In this section we outline CoVaR estimation. In Section 3.1, we describe the basic time-invariant
regressions that are used to generate Figure 1. In Section 3.2, we describe estimation of the
time-varying, conditional CoVaR. Details on the econometrics are given in Appendix A. Section
3.3 provides estimates of CoVaR and discusses properties of the estimates.
3.1 Estimation Method: Quantile Regression
We use quantile regressions to estimate CoVaR.7 To see the attractiveness of quantile regres-
sions, consider the predicted value of a quantile regression of the ﬁnancial sector ˆ 

 on a
particular institution or portfolio  for the -quantile:
ˆ 
 =ˆ 





 denotes the predicted value for a particular quantile conditional on institution
.8 In principle, this regression could be extended to allow for nonlinearities by introducing
higher order dependence of the system return as a function of returns to institution .F r o mt h e
deﬁnition of value at risk, it follows directly that
VaR
 | = ˆ 
 .( 3 )
That is, the predicted value from the quantile regression of the system on institution  gives
the value at risk of the ﬁnancial system conditional on , since the VaR given  is just the
conditional quantile. Using a particular predicted value of  =VaR
 yields our CoVaR
 mea-
sure (for the conditioning event
©
 =   

ª
). More formally, within the quantile regression
7The CoVaR measure can be computed in various ways. Quantile regressions are a particularly eﬃcient way
to estimate CoVaR. It should be emphasized, however, that quantile regressions are by no means the only way
to estimate CoVaR.A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,CoVaR c a nb ec o m p u t e df r o mm o d e l sw i t ht i m e - v a r y i n gs e c o n dm o m e n t s ,
from measures of extreme events, or by bootstrapping past returns. In Appendix B we provide a comparison to
estimation using a bivariate GARCH model.
8Note that a median regression is the special case of a quantile regression where  =5 0 % .We provide a short
synopsis of quantile regressions in the context of linear factor models in Appendix A. Koenker (2005) provides a
more detailed overview of many econometric issues.
While quantile regressions are used regularly in many applied ﬁelds of economics, their applications to ﬁnancial
economics are limited.












 is then given by
∆CoVaR|











 estimates for Figure 1 are based on equation (5), where
an asset’s estimated VaR
 is simply the  -quantile of its returns. In the remainder of the
paper, we use conditional VaR and ∆CoVaR estimates that explicitly model the time variation
of the joint distribution of asset returns as a function of lagged systematic state variables.
3.2 Time Variation Associated With Systematic State Variables
The previous section presented a methodology for estimating CoVaR that is constant over time.
To capture time variation in the joint distribution of  and , we estimate the conditional
distribution as a function of state variables. We indicate time-varying CoVaR and VaR with
a subscript  and estimate the time variation conditional on a vector of lagged state variables
−1. We run the following quantile regressions in the weekly data (where  is an institution):





 = | + |
 + |−1 + 
|
 .( 6 b )






()=ˆ | + ˆ 
|
  
()+ˆ |−1.( 7 b )
14Finally, we compute ∆
 for each institution:
∆
 ()=









From these regressions, we obtain a panel of weekly ∆CoVaR
. For the forecasting regressions
in Section 4, we generate a quarterly time series by summing the risk measures within each
quarter.
The systematic state variables −1 are lagged. They should not be interpreted as systematic
risk factors, but rather as conditioning variables that are shifting the conditional mean and the
conditional volatility of the risk measures. Note that diﬀerent ﬁrms can load on these risk
factors in diﬀerent directions, so that particular correlations of the risk measures across ﬁrms–
or correlations of the diﬀerent risk measures for the same ﬁrm–are not imposed by construction.
State variables: To estimate the time-varying CoVaR and VaR, we include a set of state
variables  that are (i) well known to capture time variation in conditional moments of asset
returns, and (ii) liquid and easily tradable. We restrict ourselves to a small set of risk factors to
avoid overﬁtting the data. Our factors are:
(i) VIX, which captures the implied volatility in the stock market reported by the Chicago
Board Options Exchange.9
(ii) A short term “liquidity spread,” deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the three-month repo
rate and the three-month bill rate. This liquidity spread measures short-term liquidity risk. We
use the three-month general collateral repo rate that is available on Bloomberg, and obtain the
three-month Treasury rate from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.10
(iii) The change in the three-month Treasury bill rate from the Federal Reserve Board’s
H.15. We use the change in the three-month Treasury bill rate because we ﬁnd that the change,
9The VIX is available only since 1990. We use the VXO for the 1986-90 period by running a regression of
the VIX on the VXO for the 1990-2010 period and then using the predicted value from that regression for the
1986-89 period.
10The three-month repo rate is available on Bloomberg only since 1990. We use the three-month Libor rate as
reported by the British Bankers Association for the 1986-90 period by running a regression of the repo rate on
the libor rate for the 1990-2010 period and then using the predicted value from that regression for the 1986-89
period.
15not the level, is most signiﬁcant in explaining the tails of ﬁnancial sector market-valued asset
returns.
In addition, we consider the following two ﬁxed-income factors that capture the time variation
in the tails of asset returns:
(iv) The change in the slope of the yield curve, measured by the yield spread between the
ten-year Treasury rate and the three-month bill rate obtained from the Federal Reserve Board’s
H.15 release.
(v) The change in the credit spread between BAA-rated bonds and the Treasury rate (with
the same maturity of ten years) from the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 release.
We further control for the following equity market returns:
(vi) The weekly equity market return from CRSP.
(vii) The weekly real estate sector return in excess of the market return (from the real estate
companies with SIC code 65-66).
T h ef o l l o w i n gt a b l eg i v es u m m a r ys t a t i s t i c sfor the state variables. We also report the 1%
stress level, which is the variable’s mean conditional on the ﬁnancial system being in its historical
1% tail.
[Table 1 here]
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the state variables. The 1% stress level is the level
of each respective variable during the 1% worst weeks for ﬁnancial system asset returns. For
example, the average of the VIX during the stress periods is 51.66, as the worst times for
the ﬁnancial system include the times when the VIX was highest. Similarly, the stress level
corresponds to a high level of the liquidity spread, a sharp decline in the Treasury bill rate,
sharp increases of the term and credit spreads, and large negative equity return realizations.
In general, by comparing the extreme values of the state variables to the numbers of standard
deviations away from their mean, we can see that the distributions appear highly skewed.
3.3 CoVaR Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides the estimates of our weekly conditional 1%-CoVaR measures that we obtain
from using quantile regressions. Each of the summary statistics constitutes the universe of
16ﬁnancial institutions.
[Table 2 here]
Line (1) of Table 2 give the summary statistics for the market-valued total asset growth
rates; line (2) gives the summary statistics for the VaR
 for each institution; line (3) gives the
summary statistics for ∆CoVaR
; lines (4) gives the summary statistics for the 1%-stress level
of ∆CoVaR
; and line (5) gives the summary statistics for the ﬁnancial system value at risk,
VaR

 .T h e s t r e s s ∆CoVaR
 is estimated by substituting the worst 1% of state variable
realizations into the ∆CoVaR
 estimates.
Recall that ∆CoVaR
 measures the marginal contribution of institution  to overall systemic
risk and reﬂects the diﬀerence between the value at risk of the ﬁnancial universe conditional
on the stressed and the median state of institution . We report the mean, standard deviation,
and number of observations for each of the items in Table 2. All of the numbers are expressed
in weekly percent returns. We have a total of 1226 institutions in the sample, with an average
length of 645 weeks. The institution with the longest history spans all 1300 weeks of the 1986Q1-
2010Q4 sample period. We require institutions to have at least 260 weeks of asset return data
in order to be included in the panel. In the following analysis, we focus primarily on the 1%
and the 5% quantiles, corresponding to the worst 13 weeks and the worst 65 weeks over the
sample horizon, respectively. It is straightforward to estimate more extreme tails following the
methodology laid forward by Chernozhukov and Du (2008), an analysis that we leave for future
research. In the following analysis, we ﬁnd results that are largely qualitatively similar for the
1% and the 5% quantiles.
[Table 3 here]
We obtain time variation of the risk measures by running quantile regressions of asset returns
on the lagged state variables. We report average −stats of these regressions in Table 3. A higher
VIX, higher repo spread, and lower market return tend to be associated with more negative
risk measures. In addition, increases in the three-month yield, declines in the term spread,
and increases the credit spread tend to be associated with larger risk. Overall, the average
signiﬁcance of the conditioning variables reported in Table 3 show that the state variables do
indeed proxy for the time variation in the quantiles and particularly in CoVaR.
173.4 CoVaR versus VaR
Figure 1 shows that, across institutions,t h e r ei so n l yav e r yl o o s el i n kb e t w e e na ni n s t i t u t i o n ’ s
VaR and its contribution to systemic risk as measured by ∆CoVaR.H e n c e ,i m p o s i n gﬁnancial
regulation solely based on the risk of an institution in isolation might not be suﬃcient to insulate
the ﬁnancial sector against systemic risk. Figure 2 repeats the scatter plot of ∆CoVaR against
VaR for 240 portfolios, grouped by 60 portfolios for each of the four ﬁnancial industries.11 We
do so, since one might argue that ﬁrms change their risk taking behavior over the sample span
of 1986 to 2010. Using portfolios, ∆CoVaR and VaR have only a weak relationship in the
cross section. However, they have a strong relationship in the time series. This can be seen in
Figure 3, which plots the time series of the ∆CoVaR and VaR for the portfolio of large broker
dealers over time. We note that the cross sectional average of ∆CoVaR including all institutions
has a very close time series relationship with the value at risk of the ﬁnancial system, VaR,
per construction. One way to interpret the ∆CoVaR is by viewing them as cross sectional
allocation of system wide risk to the various institutions.
4 Forward-∆CoVaR
In this section, we calculate forward looking systemic risk measures that can be used for ﬁnancial
stability monitoring, and as a basis for (countercyclical) macroprudential policy. We ﬁrst present
the construction of the “forward-∆CoVaR”, and then present out of sample tests. We ﬁnally
discuss how the measures could be used as a basis for capital surcharge calibrations.
Instead of tying ﬁnancial regulation directly to ∆CoVaR, we propose to link it to ﬁnancial
institutions’ characteristics that predict their future ∆CoVaR. This addresses two key issues
of systemic risk regulation: measurement accuracy and procyclicality. Any tail risk measure,
estimated at a high frequency, is by its very nature imprecise. Quantifying the relationship
between ∆CoVaR and more easily observable institution-speciﬁc variables, such as size, leverage,
and maturity mismatch, allows for more robust inference than measuring ∆CoVaR directly.
Furthermore, using these variables to predict future contributions to systemic risk addresses
the inherent procyclicality of market-based risk measures. This ensures that ∆CoVaR-based
11The portfolios are constructed from quintiles by market-valued assets, 2- year market-valued asset growth,
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Figure 2: The scatter plot shows the weak cross-sectional link between the time-series average
of a portfolio’s risk in isolation, measured by VaR (x-axis), and the time-series average of a
portfolio’s contribution to system risk, measured by ∆CoVaR (y-axis). The VaR and ∆CoVaR
are in units of weekly percent returns to total market-valued ﬁnancial assets and measured at
the 1% level.
ﬁnancial regulation is implemented in a forward-looking way that counteracts the procyclicality
of current regulation.
4.1 Constructing the Forward-∆CoVaR
We relate estimates of time-varying ∆CoVaR to characteristics of ﬁnancial institutions. We
collect the following set of characteristics:
1. leverage, deﬁned as total assets / total equity ( i nb o o kv a l u e s ) ;
2. maturity mismatch, deﬁned as (short term debt - cash) / total liabilities;
3. market-to-book, deﬁned as the ratio of the market to the book value of total equity;
4. size, deﬁned by the log of total book equity;
5. equity return volatility, computed from daily equity return data within each quarter;





































































Figure 3: This ﬁgure shows the market-valued asset returns (blue), the 1%-VaR (gray), and
the 1%-∆CoVaR (red) for a portfolio of the 20% of largest investment banks. The 1%-stress
∆CoVaR is also plotted. All risk measures are in precent weekly returns to total market-valued
assets.
Table 4 provides the summary statistics for ∆CoVaR at the quarterly frequency, and the
quarterly ﬁrm characteristics. In Table 5, we ask whether systemic risk contribution can be
forecast cross sectionally by lagged characteristics at diﬀerent time horizons. Table 5 shows
that ﬁrms with higher leverage, more maturity mismatch, and larger size tend to be associated
with larger systemic risk contributions one quarter, one year, and two years later, both at the
1% and the 5% levels. These ∆CoVaR regressions are run with risk measures that are time-
aggregated by summing the weekly measures within each quarter. The coeﬃcients in Table 5
are sensitivities of ∆CoVaR with respect to the characteristics expressed in units of basis points
of systemic risk contribution. For example, the coeﬃcient of −67 or the leverage forecast at
the two-year horizon implies that an increase in leverage (say, from 15 to 16) of an institution
is associated with an increase in systemic risk contribution of 67 b a s i sp o i n t so fq u a r t e r l ya s s e t
returns at the 5% systemic risk level. For an institution that has $1 trillion of total market-
valued assets, that translates into $67 billion of systemic risk contribution. Columns (1)-(3)
and (4)-(6) of Table 5 can be understood as a “term structure” of systemic risk contribution if
20read from right to left. The comparison of Panels A and B provide a gauge of the “tailness” of
systemic risk contribution.
The regression coeﬃcients of Table 5 can be used to weigh the relative importance of various
ﬁrm characteristics. To make this more explicit, consider the following example: Suppose a small
bank is subject to a tier-one capital requirement of 7%. That is, the “leverage ratio” cannot
exceed 1:1 4 .12 Our analysis answers the question of how much stricter the capital requirement
should be for a larger bank with the same leverage, assuming that the small bank and the large
bank are allowed a ﬁxed level of systemic risk contribution ∆CoVaR. If the larger bank is 10
percent larger than the smaller bank, then the size coeﬃcient predicts that its ∆CoVaR per
unit of capital is 27 basis points larger than the small bank’s ∆CoVaR. To ensure that both
banks have the same ∆ CoVaR per unit of capital, the large bank would have to reduce its
maximum leverage from 1:1 4to 1:1 0 . In other words, the large bank should face a capital
requirement of 10% instead of 7%. The exact trade-oﬀ between size and leverage is given by
the ratio of the two respective coeﬃcients of our forecasting regressions. Of course, in order to
achieve a given level of systemic risk contribution per units of total assets, instead of lowering
the size, the bank could also reduce its maturity mismatch or improve its systemic risk proﬁle
along other dimensions. Similarly, for a Pigouvian taxation scheme, the regression coeﬃcients
should determine the weight of leverage, maturity mismatch, size, and other characteristics in
forming the tax base.
This methods allows the connection of macroprudential policy with frequently and robustly
measured characteristics. ∆CoVaR–like any tail risk measure–relies on relatively few extreme-
crisis data points. Hence, adverse movements, especially followed by periods of stability, can
lead to sizable increases in tail risk measures. In contrast, measurement of characteristics such
as size are very robust, and they can be measured more reliaiably at higher frequencies. The
debate on “too big to fail” suggests that size is the all-dominating variable, indicating that
large institutions should face a more stringent regulation compared to smaller institutions. As
mentioned above, unlike a co-risk measure, the “size only” approach fails to acknowledge that
many small institutions can be “systemic as part of a herd.” Our solution to this problem is to
12We are loose here, since the Basel capital requirement refers to ratio between equity capital and risk weighted
assets, while our study simply takes total assets.
21combine the virtues of both types of measures by projecting the spillover risk measure ∆CoVaR
on multiple, more frequently observable variables.
This method can also address the procyclicality of contemporaneous risk measures. Sys-
temic risk builds up before an actual ﬁnancial crisis occurs and any regulation that relies on
contemporaneous risk measure estimates would be unnecessarily tight after adverse events and
unnecessarily loose in periods of stability. In other words, it would amplify the adverse impacts
after bad shocks, while also amplifying balance sheet expansions in expansions.13 Hence, we
propose to focus on variables that can be reliably measured at a quarterly frequency and predict
future, rather than contemporaneous, ∆CoVaR.
4.2 Forward-∆CoVaR for Bank Holding Companies
Ideally, one would like to link macroprudential policies to more instititutional characteristics
than simply size, leverage, maturity mismatch etc. If one restricts the sample to bank holding
companies, we have more characteristic data to extend our method. On the asset side of banks’
balance sheets, we use loans, loan-loss allowances, intangible loss allowances, intangible assets,
and trading assets. Each of these asset composition variables is expressed as a percent of total
book assets. The cross-sectional regressions with these asset composition variables are reported
in Panel A of Table 6. In order to capture the liability side of banks’ balance sheets, we use
interest-bearing core deposits (IBC), non-interest-bearing deposits (NIB), large time deposits
(LT), and demand deposits. Each of these variables is expressed as a percent of total book
assets. The variables can be interpreted as reﬁnements of the maturity mismatch variable used
earlier. The cross-sectional regressions with the liability aggregates are reported in Panel B of
Table 6.
[Table 6 here]
Panel A of Table 6 shows which types of liability variables are signiﬁcantly increasing or
decreasing systemic risk contribution. Bank holding companies with a higher fraction of non-
interest-bearing deposits have a signiﬁcantly higher systemic risk contribution, while interest
bearing core deposits and large time deposits are decreasing the forward estimate of ∆CoVaR.
13See Estrella (2004), Kashyap and Stein (2004), and Gordy and Howells (2006) for studies of the procyclical
nature of capital regulation.
22Non-interest-bearing deposits are typically held by nonﬁnancial corporations and households,
and can be quickly reallocated across banks conditional on stress in a particular institution.
Interest-bearing core deposits and large time deposits, on the other hand, are more stable sources
of funding and are thus decreasing the systemic tail risk contribution (i.e., they have a posi-
tive sign). The share of deposits is not signiﬁcant. The maturity-mismatch variable that we
constructed for the universe of ﬁnancial institutions is no longer signiﬁcant once we include the
more reﬁned liability measures for the bank holding companies. In fact, in some speciﬁcations,
the maturity mismatch variable is signiﬁcant with the wrong sign.
Panel B of Table 6 shows that loan-loss allowances and trading assets are particularly good
predictors for the cross-sectional dispersion of future systemic risk contribution. The fraction of
intangible assets is marginally signiﬁcant. Conditional on these variables, the size of total loans
as a fraction of book equity tends to decrease systemic risk contribution, which might be due
to the accounting treatment of loans: loans are held at historical book value, and deteriorating
loan quality is captured by the loan-loss reserves. By including loan-loss reserves, trading assets,
and intangible assets in the regression gives rise to lower estimates of systemic risk contribution.
In summary, the results of Table 6, in comparison to Table 5, show that more informa-
tion about the balance sheet characteristics of ﬁnancial institutions can potentially improve
the estimated forward ∆CoVaR. We expect additional data that capture particular activities
of ﬁnancial institutions, as well as supervisory data, to lead to further improvements in the
estimation precision of forward systemic risk contribution.
4.3 Out of Sample Forward-∆CoVaR
We compute “forward ∆CoVaR”as the predicted value from the panel regression reported in
T a b l e5 .W eg e n e r a t et h i sf o r w a r d∆CoVaR “in sample” through 2000, and then out of sample
by re-estimating the panel regression each quarter, and computing the predicted value. Since
o n ec a n n o tu s et i m ee ﬀects in an out of sample exercise, we use the macro state variables to
capture common variation across time.
We plot the ∆CoVaR together with the two-year forward ∆CoVaR for the average of the
largest 50 ﬁnancial institutions in Figure 4. The ﬁgure clearly shows the strong negative corre-
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Figure 4: Out-of-Sample Forward ∆CoVaR:T h i s ﬁgure shows average forward and contem-
poraneous 5% ∆CoVaR estimated out-of-sample for the top 50 ﬁnancial institutions estimated
out-of-sample. First, weekly contemporaneous ∆ is estimated out-of-sample starting in
2000Q1 at one quarter increments with an expanding window. Forward ∆ is generated
as described in the paper but in an out-of-sample fashion, again beginning in 2000Q1. The
forward ∆ at a given date uses the data available at that time to predict ∆ two
years in the future.
credit boom of 2003-06, the contemporaneous ∆CoVaR is estimated to be small (in absolute
value), while the forward ∆CoVaR is large (in absolute value). Macroprudential regulation
based on the forward ∆CoVaR are thus countercyclical.
Next, we extend the in sample panel estimates reported in Tables 5 and 6 to out of sample
estimates. In particular, we show that the forward ∆CoVaR predicts the cross section of systemic
risk realizations out of sample. In order to show the out of sample performance, we need a
measure of realized systemic risk contribution. As a proxy, we compute covariances of ﬁnancial
institutions with the ﬁnancial system during the ﬁnancial crisis. In particular, we estimate this
crisis covariance as the realized covariance from weekly data for 2007Q2 - 2009Q1. We use the
forward ∆CoVaR estimated with data as of 2006Q4 in order to forecast the cross section of
realized crisis covariances. We use the 5% level, though we found that the 1% gives very similar
results.
24[Table 7 here]
Table 7 shows that the forward ∆CoVaR as of the end of 2006 was able to explain a little bit
over 50% of the cross sectional covariance during the crisis. We view this result as a very strong
one. Comparison of columns (1)-(3) shows that the forward horizon did not matter much in
terms of cross sectional explanatory power. Furthermore, column (4) shows that the information
contained in the estimated forward measures captures most of the ability of ﬁrm characteristics
to predict crisis covariance, as the individual characteristics only generate a slightly higher -
squared statistic. The forward ∆CoVaR thus summarizes in a single variable for each ﬁrm the
extent to which it is expected to contribute to future systemic risk.
5C o n c l u s i o n
During ﬁnancial crises or periods of ﬁnancial intermediary distress, tail events tend to spill across
ﬁnancial institutions. Such spillovers are preceded by a risk-buildup phase. Both elements are
important contributors to ﬁnancial system risk. ∆CoVaR is a parsimonious measure of systemic
risk that complements measures designed for individual ﬁnancial institutions. ∆CoVaR broadens
risk measurement to allow a macroprudential perspective. The forward-∆CoVaR is a forward
looking measure of systemic risk contribution. It is constructed by projecting ∆CoVaR on
lagged ﬁrm characteristics such as size, leverage, maturity mismatch, and industry dummies.
This forward looking measure can potentially be used in macroprudential policy applications.
25References
Acharya, V. (2009): “A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation,”
Journal of Financial Stability, 5(3), 224 — 255.
Acharya, V., L. Pedersen, T. Philippon, and M. Richardson (2010): “Measuring Sys-
temic Risk,” NYU Working Paper.
Adams, Z., R. Füss, and R. Gropp (2010): “Modeling Spillover Eﬀects Among Financial In-
stitutions: A State-Dependent Sensitivity Value-at-Risk (SDSVaR) Approach,” EBS Working
Paper.
Adrian, T., and H. Shin (2010a): “The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and the
Financial Crisis of 2007-2009,” Annual Review of Economics, (2), 603—618.
Adrian, T., and H. S. Shin (2010b): “Liquidity and Leverage,” Journal of Financial Inter-
mediation, 19(3), 418—437.
Allen, F., A. Babus, and E. Carletti (2010): “Financial Connections and Systemic Risk,”
European Banking Center Discussion Paper.
Bassett, G. W., and R. Koenker (1978): “Asymptotic Theory of Least Absolute Error
Regression,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 73(363), 618—622.
Bhattacharya, S., and D. Gale (1987): “Preference Shocks, Liquidity and Central Bank
Policy,” in New Approaches to Monetary Economics, ed. by W. A. Barnett, and K. J. Singleton.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
B i l l i o ,M . ,M .G e t m a n s k y ,A .L o ,and L. Pelizzon (2010): “Measuring Systemic Risk in
the Finance and Insurance Sectors,” MIT Working Paper.
Bodie, Z., D. Gray, and R. Merton (2007): “New Framework for Measuring and Managing
Macroﬁnancial Risk and Financial Stability,” NBER Working Paper.
Borio, C. (2004): “Market Distress and Vanishing Liquidity: Anatomy and Policy Options,”
BIS Working Paper 158.
Brady, N. F. (1988): “Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms,” U.S.
Government Printing Oﬃce.
Brunnermeier, M., and Y. Sannikov (2009): “A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial
Sector,” Princeton University Working Paper.
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009): “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08,” Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 23(1), 77—100.
Brunnermeier, M. K., and P. Cheridito (2011): “Systemic Risk Charges,” Princeton Uni-
versity working paper.
Brunnermeier, M. K., A. Crocket, C. Goodhart, A. Perssaud, and H. Shin (2009):
The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: 11th Geneva Report on the World Econ-
omy.
26Brunnermeier, M. K., and L. H. Pedersen (2009): “Market Liquidity and Funding Liq-
uidity,” Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2201—2238.
Caballero, R., and A. Krishnamurthy (2004): “Smoothing Sudden Stops,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 119(1), 104—127.
Cao, Z. (2010): “Shapley Value and CoVaR,” Bank of France Working Paper.
Chernozhukov, V., and S. Du (2008): “Extremal Quantiles and Value-at-Risk,” The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition(1), 271—292.
Chernozhukov, V., and L. Umantsev (2001): “Conditional Value-at-Risk: Aspects of Mod-
eling and Estimation,” Empirical Economics, 26(1), 271—292.
Claessens, S., and K. Forbes (2001): International Financial Contagion. Springer: New
York.
Danielsson, J., and C. G. de Vries (2000): “Value-at-Risk and Extreme Returns,” Annales
d’Economie et de Statistique, 60, 239—270.
Engle, R. F., and S. Manganelli (2004): “CAViaR: Conditional Autoregressive Value at
Risk by Regression Quantiles,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 23(4).
Estrella, A. (2004): “The Cyclical Behavior of Optimal Bank Capital,” Journal of Banking
and Finance, 28(6), 1469—1498.
Gauthier, C., A. Lehar, and M. Souissi (2009): “Macroprudential Capital Requirements
and Systemic Risk,” Bank of Canada Working Paper.
Geanakoplos, J., and H. Polemarchakis (1986): “Existence, Regularity, and Constrained
Suboptimality of Competitive Allocation When the Market is Incomplete,” in Uncertainty,
Information and Communication, Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow,v o l .3 .
Giglio, S. (2011): “Credit Default Swap Spreads and Systemic Financial Risk,” working paper,
Harvard University.
Gordy, M., and B. Howells (2006): “Procyclicality in Basel II: Can we treat the disease
without killing the patient?,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 15, 395—417.
Gorton, G., and A. Metrick (2010): “Haircuts,” NBER Working Paper 15273.
Gray, D., R. Merton, and Z. Bodie (2007): “Contingent Claims Approach to Measuring
and Managing Sovereign Credit Risk,” Journal of Investment Management, 5(4), 5—28.
Hartmann, P., S. Straetmans, and C. G. de Vries (2004): “Asset Market Linkages in
Crisis Periods,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1), 313—326.
Huang, X., H. Zhou, and H. Zhu (2010): “Measuring Systemic Risk Contributions,” BIS
Working Paper.
Jorion, P. (2006): “Value at Risk,” McGraw-Hill, 3rd edn.
Kashyap, A. A., and J. Stein (2004): “Cyclical Implications of the Basel II Capital Stan-
dards,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, 28(1).
27Koenker, R. (2005): Quantile Regression. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
Koenker, R., and G. W. Bassett (1978): “Regression Quantiles,” Econometrica, 46(1),
33—50.
Korinek, A. (2010): “Systemic Risk-taking: Ampliﬁcation Eﬀects, Externalities and Regula-
tory Responses,” University of Maryland Working Paper.
Kupiec, P. (2002): “Stress-testing in a Value at Risk Framework,” Risk Management: Value
at Risk and Beyond.
Lehar, A. (2005): “Measuring systemic risk: A risk management approach,” Journal of Bank-
ing and Finance, 29(10), 2577—2603.
Lorenzoni, G. (2008): “Ineﬃc i e n tC r e d i tB o o m s , ”Review of Economic Studies, 75(3), 809—
833.
Manganelli, S., T.-H. Kim, and H. White (2011): “VAR for VaR: Measuring Systemic
Risk Using Multivariate Regression Quantiles,” unpublished working paper, ECB.
Rubin, R. E., A. Greenspan, A. Levitt, and B. Born (1999): “Hedge Funds, Leverage,
and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management,” Report of The President’s Working
Group on Financial Markets.
Segoviano, M., and C. Goodhart (2009): “Banking Stability Measures,” Financial Markets
Group Working Paper, London School of Economics and Political Science.
Stein, J. (2009): “Presidential Address: Sophisticated Investors and Market Eﬃciency,” The
Journal of Finance, 64(4), 1517—1548.
Stiglitz, J. (1982): “The Ineﬃciency of Stock Market Equilibrium,” Review of Economic
Studies, 49, 241—261.
Tarashev, N., C. Borio, and K. Tsatsaronis (2009): “The systemic importance of ﬁnancial
institutions,” BIS Quarterly Review.
Wong, A., and T. Fong (2010): “An Analysis of the Interconnectivity among the Asia-Paciﬁc
Economies,” Hong Kong Monetary Authority Working Paper.
28Appendices
A CoVaR Estimation via Quantile Regressions
This appendix explains how to use quantile regressions to estimate VaR and CoVaR. Suppose
that returns 
 have the following linear factor structure


 = 0 + −11 + 
2 +
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where −1 is a vector of state variables. The error term  is assumed to be i.i.d. with zero
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¢
depend on the set of state variables −1 and on 
.T h ec o e ﬃcients 0
1,a n d3 could be estimated consistently via OLS of 
 on −1 and 
. The predicted value
of such an OLS regression would be the mean of 

 conditional on −1 and 
. In order to
compute the VaR and CoVaR from OLS regressions, one would have to also estimate 3, 4 and
5, and then make distributional assumptions about 

.14 T h eq u a n t i l er e g r e s s i o n si n c o r p o r a t e
estimates of the conditional mean and the conditional volatility to produce conditional quantiles,
without the distributional assumptions that would be needed for estimation via OLS.
Instead of using OLS regressions, we use quantile regressions to estimate model (10) for




its inverse cdf by −1











=  + −1 + 
, (11)
where  = 0 + 3−1
 (),  = 1 + 4−1
 (),a n d = 2 + 5−1
 () for quantiles








the conditional quantile function. From the deﬁnition of
14The model (10) could otherwise be estimated via maximum likelihood using a stochastic volatility or GARCH
model if distributional assumptions about  a r em a d e .T h eq u a n t i l er e g r e s s i o na p p r o a c hd o e sn o tr e q u i r es p e c i ﬁc
distributional assumptions for .
29VaR, we obtain
VaR





























 conditional on −1 and

. By conditioning on 
 =VaR
, we obtain the CoVaR
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 from the quantile function:
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We estimate the quantile function as the predicted value of the −quantile regression of 












































See Bassett and Koenker (1978) and Koenker and Bassett (1978) for ﬁnite sample and asymp-
totic properties of quantile regressions. Chernozhukov and Umantsev (2001) and Chernozhukov
and Du (2008) discuss VaR applications of quantile regressions.
B Robustness Checks
B.1 GARCH ∆CoVaR
One potential shortcoming of the quantile estimation procedure described in Section 3 is that
it does not allow for estimation of the time-varying nature of systemic exposure to ﬁrm risk.
An alternative approach is to estimate bivariate GARCH models to obtain the time-varying
covariance between institutions and the ﬁnancial system. However, such an approach requires
strong distributional assumptions and takes the form of a complex optimization problem which
can be diﬃcult to estimate. As a robustness check we estimate ∆CoVaR using a bivariate
diagonal GARCH model (DVECH) and ﬁnd that this method produces estimates quite similar
to the quantile regression method, leading us to the conclusion that the quantile regression
framework is suﬃciently ﬂexible to estimate ∆CoVaR. We begin by outlining a simple Gaussian
framework under which ∆CoVaR has a closed-form expression, and then discuss the estimation
30results.




































By properties of the multivariate normal distribution, the distribution of system returns condi-





















We can deﬁne CoVaR
() as the q%-VaR of the ﬁnancial system given ﬁrm  is at its p%-VaR
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∼ (01).T h e ﬁrm value-at-risk is given by   
()=
Φ−1 ()







 + Φ−1 ()

 (17)
Because Φ−1 (50%) = 0,s o l v i n gf o r∆CoVaR gives:
∆CoVaR(q,q) = Φ−1 ()

 (18)
The primary downfall of such a speciﬁcation is that it uses an estimate of contemporaneous
correlation with the market to gauge the size of potential tail spillover eﬀects. In this sense,
this speciﬁcation is more contemporaneous than the quantile regression method, which uses
31estimates of the tail correlation taken from the entire data history. Taking into account the
heteroskedasticity of correlation in this way provides cross-sectional forecasting power where the
simple Gaussian model cannot.
Estimation We estimate a bivariate diagonal vech GARCH(1,1) for each institution in our
sample.15 As a robustness check, we estimated the panel regressions of Section 4 on a matched
sample of 145 institutions with $10billion or more in total assets for which our GARCH estimates
converged.
[Table 8 here]
The results in Table 8 show the coeﬃcients on size, maturity mismatch, and leverage are quite
similar between the GARCH and quantile estimation methods. The most notable diﬀerence,
however, is that the R-squared values of the GARCH-based regressions are nearly double those
of the quantile regressions. We found that this diﬀerence is driven entirely by the time ﬁxed
eﬀects in the regressions, which implies that there is much less cross-sectional variation in the
GARCH ∆CoVaR than in the quantile regression based estimation. In fact, a large portion of
t h et i m ev a r i a t i o ni nG A R C H∆CoVaR comes from the estimated time-varying system volatility,
while the time variation in the quantile method comes from ﬁrm-speciﬁc loadings on time-varying
risk factors. As expected, controlling for ﬁrm instead of time ﬁxed eﬀects signiﬁcantly increases
the R-squared for the quantile ∆CoVaR forecast regressions but reduces the R-squared for the
regressions using GARCH ∆CoVaR.
The diﬀerences between the quantile and the GARCH ∆CoVaR are least pronounced for the
largest institutions, which have persistently high correlation with the ﬁnancial system. Figure
5 shows the close comovement of the quantile and the GARCH based systemic risk measures
for the four largest ﬁnancial institutions. Despite the fact that the estimation methods diﬀer
sharply, we can see that the two approaches generate very similar time patterns of systemic risk
contribution. The GARCH based estimators do seem to pick up tails a bit more strongly.
15We were able to get convergence of the Garch model for 75% of ﬁrms. We found that convergence of the
models in our data is very sensitive to both missing values and extreme returns. Truncation of returns generally,







































































1985w1 1990w1 1995w1 2000w1 2005w1 2010w1
JPMorgan Chase
5%-CoVaR: Alternative Estimation
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Figure 5: Alternative Estimation of ∆CoVaR:T h i sﬁgure shows estimates of 5%-∆CoVaR for
the four largest commercial banks: Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and JP Morgan
Chase. The time series and magnitudes of these estimates are remarkably similar, indicating that
the time-varying correlation of the GARCH model adds little information for these institutions.
B.2 Financial System Return Variable
The ﬁnancial system return variable 

 used in the paper is the weekly return on the
market-valued total assets of the ﬁnancial system, as proxied by the universe of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions. This measure is generated by taking average market valued asset returns, weighted by
lagged market valued total assets. One concern with this methodology is that it might introduce
a mechanical correlation between each institution and the ﬁnancial system proportional to the
relative size of the ﬁnancial institution. We check to see if such a mechanical correlation is
driving our results by reestimating institutions’ ∆CoVaR using system return variables formed
from the value weighted returns of all other institutions in the sample, leaving out the institution
for which ∆CoVaR is being estimated.
[Table 9 here]
We ﬁnd a very strong correlation across institutions, and across time, for the two diﬀerent
systemic risk measures. In fact, even for the largest institutions do we ﬁnd a very strong
33correlation between the baseline system return variable and the modiﬁed system return, with
correlation coeﬃcients over 99%. Table 9 reports the forward CoVaR regressions for the 5%
level using both speciﬁcations. The coeﬃcients under the two speciﬁcations are statistically
indistinguishable, indicating that this mechanical correlation is not driving our results.
CD a t a D e s c r i p t i o n
C.1 CRSP and COMPUSTAT Data
As discussed in the paper, we estimate ∆CoVaR for the market-valued asset returns of ﬁnancial
institutions. We start with daily equity data from CRSP for all ﬁnancial institutions with
two-digit COMPUSTAT SIC codes between 60 and 67 inclusive, indexed by PERMNO. Banks
correspond to SIC codes 60, 61, and 6712; insurance companies correspond to SIC codes 63-64,
real estate companies correspond to SIC codes 65-6, and broker-dealers are SIC code 67 (except
for the bank holding companies, 6712). All other ﬁnancial ﬁrms in our initial sample are placed
in an “other”category. We manually adjust the COMPUSTAT SIC codes to account for the
conversions of several large institutions into bank holding companies in late 2008, but otherwise
do not ﬁnd time varying industry classiﬁcations. Following the asset pricing literature, we keep
only ordinary common shares (which exclude certiﬁcates, ADRs, SBIS, REITs, etc.) and drop
daily equity observations with missing or negative prices or missing returns. Our keeping only
ordinary common shares excludes several large international institutions, such as Credit Suisse
and Barclays, which are listed in the United States as American Depository Receipts.
The daily data are collapsed to a weekly frequency and merged with quarterly balance sheet
data from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT quarterly dataset. The quarterly data are ﬁltered to remove
leverage and book-to-market ratios less than zero and greater than 100. We also apply 1% and
99% truncation to maturity mismatch.
Market equity and balance sheet data are adjusted for mergers and acquisitions using the
CRSP daily dataset. We use a recursive algorithm to traverse the CRSP DELIST ﬁle to ﬁnd
the full acquisition history of all institutions in our sample. The history of acquired ﬁrms is
collapsed into the history of their acquirers. For example, we account for the possibility that
ﬁrm A was acquired by ﬁrm B, which was then acquired by ﬁrm C, etc. Our ﬁnal panel therefore
34does not include any ﬁrms that we are able to identify as having been ultimately acquired by
another ﬁrm in our universe. Using the merger-adjusted data, we generate weekly leverage data
as a linear interpolation of the quarterly data. Interpolated values of leverage are computed only
between no more than two consecutive quarters of missing leverage data. Weekly leverage and
market equity are used to generate market-valued asset returns. The ﬁnal estimation sample is
restricted to include ﬁrms with at least 260 weeks of non-missing market-valued asset returns. To
construct the overall ﬁnancial system portfolio (for  = ), we simply compute the average
market-valued returns of all ﬁnancial institutions, weighted by the (lagged) market value of their
assets.
C.2 Bank Holding Company Y9-C Data
Balance sheet data from the FR Y-9C reports are incorporated into our panel data set using
a mapping maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 16 W ea r ea b l et om a t c h
data for 357 U.S. bank holding companies for a total of 17,382 bank-quarter observations. The
link is constructed by matching PERMCOs in the linking table to RSSD9001 in the Y9-C data.
We then match to the last available PERMCO of each institution in our CRSP/COMPUSTAT
sample. It is important to note that our main panel of CRSP and COMPUSTAT data are
historically merger-adjusted, but the Y9-C data is not. Performing such an adjustment for
a large set of BHCs is infeasible because they mainly acquire smaller non-BHC entities with
diﬀerent data-reporting requirements and availability.
In the forecasting regressions of Table 6, these variables are expressed as a percentage of
total book assets. All ratios are truncated at the 1% and 99% level across the panel. Detailed
descriptions of the Y9-C variables listed above can be found in the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors Micro Data Reference Manual.17
16The mapping is available at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html.
17http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/mdrm
35Date Range FR Y-9C Series Name
Trading Assets 1986:Q1—1994:Q4 bhck2146
1995:Q1—2010:Q4 bhck3545
Loans Net Loan-Loss Reserves 1986:Q1—2010:Q4 bhck2122-bhck3123
Loan-Loss Reserve 1986:Q1—2010:Q4 bhck3123




Interest-Bearing Core Deposits 1986:Q1—2010:Q4 bhcb2210+bhcb3187+bhch6648
-bhdma164+bhcb2389
Non-Interest-Bearing Deposits 1986:Q1—2010:Q4 bhdm6631+bhfn6631
Large Time Deposits 1986:Q1—2010:Q4 bhcb2604
Demand Deposits 1986:Q1—2010:Q4 bhcb2210
D List of Financial Institutions for Figure 118
Banks and Thrifts:
Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia, Wells Fargo
Investment Banks:
Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley
GSEs:
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac
Insurance Companies:
American International Group, Metlife
18Industry classiﬁcations are as of 2006Q4.
36Table 1: State Variable Summary Statistics. The spreads and spread changes are expressed
in basis points, returns in percent.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1% Stress Level
VIX 20.72 8.3 10.1 90.5 51.66
Liquidity Spread 21.56 28.7 -15.6 210.9 56.31
3-month Treasury Change -0.55 10.9 -118.8 47 -23.1
Term Spread Change 0.12 12.71 -63.6 79.6 5.09
Credit Spread Change 0.03 7.4 -38.1 56.1 16.8
Equity Return 0.16 2.4 -15.3 13.827 -7.9
Real Estate Excess Return -0.081 2.8 -14.5 21.330 -4.0
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Estimated Risk Measures. The table reports summary
statistics for the asset returns and 1% risk measures of the 1226 ﬁnancial ﬁrms for weekly data
from 1986Q1-2010Q4.  denotes the weekly market-valued asset returns for the ﬁrms. The
individual ﬁrm risk measures    and the system risk measure    are obtained by
running 1-% quantile regressions of returns on the one-week lag of the state variables and by
computing the predicted value of the regression. ∆ is the diﬀerence between 1% −
 and the 50% − ,w h e r e −  is the predicted value from a  − %
quantile regression of the ﬁnancial system asset returns on the institution asset returns and on
the lagged state variables. The stress ∆ is the ∆ computed with the worst 1%
of state variable realizations and the worst 1% ﬁnancial system returns replaced in the quantile
regression. All quantities are expressed in units of weekly percent returns.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
(1) 
 0.34 7.3 791231
(2)   
 -12.17 8.00 790868
(3) ∆
 -1.16 1.30 790868
(4) Stress-∆
 -3.22 3.86 790868
(5)  

 -6.24 3.53 1226
37Table 3: Average t-Statistics of State Variable Exposures. The table reports average t-
statistics from 1%-quantile regressions. For the risk measures    and the system risk measure
  ,1 - % quantile regressions are run on the state variables. For ,1 - % quantile
regressions of the ﬁnancial system returns are run on the state variables and the ﬁrms’ asset
returns.
Variable VaR VaR CoVaR
VIX (lag) (-16.18) (-13.14) (-20.76)
Repo spread (lag) (-6.77) (-0.84) (-7.18)
Three month yield change (lag) (-1.85) (-0.69) (-2.38)
Term spread change (lag) (2.64) (-0.59) (3.10)
Credit spread change (lag) (-6.70) (-0.66) (-6.96)
Market return (lag) (16.50) (4.29) (18.64)
Housing (lag) (5.02) (2.72) (2.39)
Portfolio asset return  (8.10)
Pseudo-2 46.62% 24.02% 48.89%
Table 4: Quarterly Summary Statistics. The table reports summary statistics for the
quarterly variables in the forward ∆ regressions. The data are from 1986Q1-2010Q4,
covering 1226 ﬁnancial institutions.  is expressed in unites of quarterly basis points and
∆ is expressed in quarterly basis points of systemic risk contribution. The rest of the
variables are described in 4.1.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
(1) 1% ∆
 -1494.9 1619.5 62689
(2) 5% ∆
 -1026.7 970.9 62689
(3) 1%   
 -15873.3 9414.9 62689
(4) 5%   
 -9027.1 5071.1 62689
(5) Leverage 8.84 6.68 62624
(6) Maturity Mismatch 0.52 0.97 62689
(7) Market to Book 2.03 5.86 62633
(8) Log Equity 18.83 1.94 62637
(9) Volatility 3.09 2.79 59465
(10) Market  0.74 0.98 62689
38Table 5: ∆CoVaR Forecasts for All Publicly Traded Financial Insititutions. This
table reports the coeﬃcients from forecasting regressions of the 5% ∆CoVaR on the quarterly,
one-year, and two-year lag of ﬁrm characteristics in Panel A and for the 1% ∆CoVaR in Panel B.
Each regression has a cross section of ﬁrms. The methodology for computing the risk measures
VaR and ∆CoVaR is given in the captions of Tables 2 and 3. FE denotes ﬁxed eﬀect dummies.
All regressions include time eﬀects. Newey-West standard errors allowing for up to ﬁve periods
of autocorrelation are displayed in parentheses. One, two, and three stars denote signiﬁcance at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
P a n e lA :5 %∆ P a n e lB :1 %∆
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged Variables 2 Years 1 Year 1 Quarter 2 Years 1 Year 1 Quarter
VaR -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Book Equity -285.129*** -279.689*** -277.861*** -339.067*** -334.523*** -333.238***
(5.553) (5.195) (5.105) (10.067) (9.472) (9.372)
Market  -72.821*** -92.945*** -99.459*** -115.287*** -142.982*** -152.082***
(6.981) (6.372) (6.220) (13.104) (12.117) (11.837)
Maturity Mismatch -13.819* -12.059* -11.650* -46.644*** -43.797*** -43.048***
(7.398) (7.166) (6.866) (14.057) (13.901) (13.386)
Market To Book -18.480*** -17.571*** -16.672*** -22.827*** -21.457*** -20.084***
(3.490) (3.400) (2.988) (5.543) (5.415) (4.856)
Volatility -11.787*** -7.516*** -6.760* -5.779 -1.747 -4.016
(2.701) (2.686) (3.550) (5.523) (5.512) (7.386)
Leverage -6.765*** -7.220*** -7.229*** -6.924** -6.836** -7.187**
(1.965) (1.866) (1.811) (3.472) (3.256) (3.105)
Foreign FE 347.227*** 328.697*** 324.499*** 334.195*** 316.836*** 307.916***
(57.440) (54.077) (52.155) (87.040) (81.886) (78.677)
Insurance FE 91.849*** 91.790*** 95.932*** 25.479 36.303 48.558
(25.307) (24.119) (23.583) (45.142) (42.953) (41.763)
Real Estate FE -68.005** -59.171* -56.493* -318.607*** -293.028*** -285.247***
(32.997) (31.808) (31.031) (64.465) (62.064) (60.481)
Broker Dealer FE -343.445*** -322.611*** -304.797*** -438.256*** -416.258*** -398.936***
(36.363) (35.215) (34.418) (64.008) (61.757) (59.679)
Others FE -52.677 -35.127 -20.558 10.638 32.362 48.961
(35.654) (33.646) (32.380) (66.097) (63.482) (61.396)
Constant 4,419.804*** 4,577.975*** 4,621.168*** 4,922.344*** 5,217.287*** 5,305.055***
(126.317) (112.639) (112.157) (230.424) (205.215) (204.945)
Observations 49,351 54,127 57,750 49,351 54,127 57,750
Adjusted 2 43.63% 43.05% 42.59% 25.78% 25.48% 25.01%
39Table 6: ∆CoVaR Forecasts For Bank Holding Companies. This table reports the
coeﬃcients from cross sectional predictive regressions of the 5% ∆CoVaR on the quarterly, one
year, and two year lag of liability characteristics in Panel A, and for asset characteristics in
Panel B. Each regression has a cross section of bank holding companies. The methodology for
computing the risk measures VaR and ∆CoVaR is given in the captions of Tables 2 and 3.
All regressions include time eﬀects. IBC deposits denotes interest-bearing core deposits. NIB
deposits denotes Non-Interest-Bearing deposits. LT deposits denote large time-deposits (greater
than $100.000). Newey-West standard errors allowing for up to 5 periods of autocorrelation
are displayed in patentheses. One, two, and three stars denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Liability Variables Panel B: Asset Variables
VARIABLES 2 Year 1 Year 1 Quarter 2 Year 1 Year 1 Quarter
VaR -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log Book Equity -289.647*** -285.051*** -287.521*** -290.695*** -285.526*** -288.208***
(9.848) (8.955) (8.715) (9.586) (8.693) (8.469)
Market  -93.437*** -124.607*** -129.171*** -94.249*** -126.479*** -133.240***
(14.906) (12.526) (11.686) (14.989) (12.585) (11.736)
Maturity Mismatch 223.164*** 199.567*** 172.168*** 173.155** 133.971** 95.607
(68.266) (65.458) (64.372) (68.363) (65.852) (64.581)
Market to Book -191.263*** -183.703*** -169.412*** -201.290*** -194.260*** -180.220***
(18.321) (17.627) (16.371) (18.722) (18.017) (16.918)
Volatility 0.055 -7.431 -15.647** 1.134 -5.084 -12.241*
(8.170) (6.206) (6.888) (8.123) (6.270) (6.941)
Leverage -20.776*** -19.837*** -15.195*** -18.159*** -16.578*** -10.675***
(3.196) (3.030) (2.763) (3.204) (3.051) (2.826)
IBC Deposits 2.581** 2.530** 2.791**
(1.250) (1.196) (1.169)
NIB Deposits -16.706*** -17.455*** -18.405***
(3.422) (3.151) (2.988)
LT Deposits 7.184*** 6.388*** 6.149***
(1.325) (1.250) (1.193)
Demand Deposits 3.327 4.934 5.130*
(3.600) (3.296) (3.118)
Total Loans 4.375*** 5.478*** 5.992***
(1.160) (1.101) (1.045)
Loan Loss Reserves -30.040 -72.695*** -92.941***
(30.066) (26.489) (25.021)
Intanglible Assets 4.404 8.288 17.574**
(8.369) (7.792) (7.330)
Trading Assets -6.636* -4.842 -8.109**
(3.945) (3.645) (3.463)
Constant 4,572.101*** 4,814.428*** 4,939.731*** 4,367.466*** 4,605.555*** 4,718.841***
(229.043) (200.422) (197.411) (224.295) (194.209) (191.312)
Observations 19,558 21,289 22,590 19,558 21,289 22,590
Adjusted 2 51.68% 51.96% 51.38% 51.36% 51.77% 51.29%
40Table 7: ∆CoVaR Forecasts For Bank Holding Companies. This table reports a regres-
sion of the realized crisis covariance on the forward ∆CoVaR for the universe of Bank Holding
Companies. The crisis covariance is the realized covariance for the time span 2007Q1 - 2009Q1,
estimated from weekly data. The forward ∆CoVaR are the predictive values from a panel regres-
sion of ∆CoVaR onto lagged balance sheet variables and lagged macro variables, as of 2006Q4.
One, two, and three stars denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Crisis Covariance
2Y Forward ∆ -0.709***
1Y Forward ∆ -0.709***




Log Book Equity 0.588***
Observations 832 832 832 827
2 50.3% 50.3% 50.4% 54.2%
41Table 8: ∆CoVaR Forecasts using GARCH estimation. This table reports the coef-
ﬁcients from forecasting regressions of the two estimation methods of 5% ∆CoVaR on the
quarterly, one-year, and two-year lag of ﬁrm characteristics. The methodology for computing
t h eq u a n t i l er e g r e s s i o n∆CoVaR is given in the captions of Tables 2 and 3. FE denotes ﬁxed
eﬀect dummies. The GARCH ∆CoVaR is computed by estimating the covariance structure of
a bivariate diagnonal VECH GARCH model. All regressions include time eﬀects. In this table
VaR is estimated using a GARCH(1,1) model. Newey−West standard errors allowing for up to
ﬁve periods of autocorrelation are dispalyed in parentheses. One, two, and three stars denote
signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
2 Year 1 Year 1 Quarter
VARIABLES Quantile GARCH Quantile GARCH Quantile GARCH
VaR (from GARCH) -0.041*** -0.024*** -0.032*** -0.019*** -0.032*** -0.033***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log Book Equity -315.817*** -398.050*** -312.856*** -399.817*** -315.404*** -382.759***
(16.038) (14.302) (15.368) (13.031) (15.295) (12.744)
Market  -84.291*** -248.159*** -139.601*** -333.821*** -148.788*** -488.841***
(32.259) (29.281) (30.276) (27.072) (30.312) (28.259)
Maturity Mismatch -27.129 -37.249 -45.519 -45.328 -53.534 -19.636
(38.386) (43.417) (38.461) (44.664) (38.432) (42.863)
Market to Book -15.585*** -9.109*** -13.118*** -10.717*** -12.525*** -11.651***
(3.381) (2.835) (3.622) (2.792) (3.463) (2.057)
Volatility -29.611* 35.273** -42.131*** 59.179*** -73.635*** 67.441***
(17.538) (16.681) (15.675) (18.629) (19.603) (24.545)
Leverage -4.783 -5.641* -4.669 -7.172** -3.520 -8.131***
(4.678) (2.905) (4.798) (2.823) (4.853) (2.875)
Foreign FE 868.656*** 492.486*** 831.951*** 484.021*** 812.464*** 485.913***
(127.493) (105.187) (122.831) (96.542) (121.606) (92.098)
Insurance FE 195.261*** 380.863*** 178.982*** 342.528*** 182.955*** 312.164***
(59.633) (46.646) (58.922) (44.175) (59.656) (42.442)
Real Estate FE -280.118*** 271.617** -308.240*** 230.222** -333.649*** 184.723*
(95.111) (108.668) (93.444) (102.622) (89.820) (97.630)
Broker-Dealer FE -581.106*** -447.003*** -525.245*** -347.995*** -507.003*** -290.299***
(86.882) (65.064) (88.249) (63.062) (88.640) (61.052)
Others FE 240.091 409.705 211.535 408.266 237.068* 366.190*
(164.333) (327.338) (154.073) (260.577) (141.656) (187.654)
Constant 3,283.473*** 3,570.076*** 4,311.172*** 5,720.837*** 4,402.390*** 5,467.105***
(358.088) (319.286) (328.797) (282.154) (327.029) (282.839)
Observations 8,873 8,873 9,423 9,423 9,823 9,823
Adjusted 2 49.70% 81.22% 49.10% 81.54% 48.68% 82.16%
42Table 9: ∆CoVaR Forecasts using alternative system returns variable. This table re-
ports the coeﬃcients from forecasting regressions of the two estimation methods of 5% ∆CoVaR
on the quarterly, one-year, and two-year lag of ﬁrm characteristics. In the columns labeled
, ∆CoVaR is estimated using the regular system returns variable described in Section
3, while in columns labeled −, ∆CoVaR is estimated using a system return variable
that does not include the ﬁrm for which ∆CoVaR is being estimated. The methodology for
computing the quantile regression ∆ CoVaR is given in the captions of Tables 2 and 3. FE
denotes ﬁxed eﬀect dummies. All regressions include time eﬀects. Newey−West standard errors
allowing for ﬁve periods of autocorrelation are displayed in parentheses. One, two, and three
stars denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
2Y e a r 1Y e a r 1Q u a r t e r
VARIABLES  −  −  −
5%   -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Log Book Equity -285.129*** -274.866*** -279.689*** -269.861*** -277.861*** -268.137***
(5.553) (5.381) (5.195) (5.030) (5.105) (4.934)
Market  -72.821*** -74.588*** -92.945*** -94.357*** -99.459*** -100.788***
(6.981) (6.914) (6.372) (6.323) (6.220) (6.167)
Maturity Mismatch -13.819* -16.075** -12.059* -14.292** -11.650* -13.744**
(7.398) (7.328) (7.166) (7.106) (6.866) (6.813)
Market to Book -18.480*** -18.113*** -17.571*** -17.254*** -16.672*** -16.363***
(3.490) (3.416) (3.400) (3.335) (2.988) (2.932)
Volatility -11.787*** -9.714*** -7.516*** -6.024** -6.760* -5.303
(2.701) (2.648) (2.686) (2.445) (3.550) (3.289)
Leverage -6.765*** -5.475*** -7.220*** -5.980*** -7.229*** -6.107***
(1.965) (1.907) (1.866) (1.819) (1.811) (1.773)
Foreign FE 347.227*** 344.731*** 328.697*** 326.694*** 324.499*** 323.158***
(57.440) (56.363) (54.077) (53.145) (52.155) (51.176)
Insurance FE 91.849*** 84.374*** 91.790*** 84.463*** 95.932*** 88.143***
(25.307) (25.016) (24.119) (23.871) (23.583) (23.358)
Real Estate FE -68.005** -62.722* -59.171* -54.136* -56.493* -52.235*
(32.997) (32.801) (31.808) (31.653) (31.031) (30.893)
Broker-Dealer FE -343.445*** -335.785*** -322.611*** -315.165*** -304.797*** -297.740***
(36.363) (35.759) (35.215) (34.669) (34.418) (33.858)
Others FE -52.677 -47.266 -35.127 -29.750 -20.558 -15.980
(35.654) (35.251) (33.646) (33.275) (32.380) (32.038)
Constant 4,419.804*** 4,196.287*** 4,577.975*** 4,374.726*** 4,621.168*** 4,421.007***
(126.317) (122.764) (112.639) (109.305) (112.157) (108.720)
Observations 49,351 49,351 54,127 54,127 57,750 57,750
Adjusted 2 43.63% 42.75% 43.05% 43.05% 42.59% 41.72%
43